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cultures develop by taking in each other's washing; but call it by a biological name and you have a strict analogy to the process by which a variety of individuals are produced through a hybridized heredity. It is not unreasonable to expect from this principle the growth of a science of culture-genetics.

And lest the theory of cultures become hyper-individualized, the social multiverse idea will need to be dispelled—or psycho-analyzed away. On the basis of Cooley's truism that "a separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience,"⁷ which seems commonplace until you study it a bit, some hypotheses may be built of the identity between the linking of traditions in a culture and the development of behavior-complexes in an individual. After all, a "complex" is only a system of cultural influences provoked into action by a culturally appropriate social situation. The analysis of character is the analysis of culture-complexes.

It may even appear in the end that *Homo sapiens* meant *Homo domesticus*.

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THE GROUP SPIRIT AND THE FEAR OF THE DEAD

TOUGHT, like all history, frequently appears to repeat itself. Sir Thomas Browne began his essay on "Dreams" by writing: "The day supplieth us with truths, the night with pictures and falsehoods, which uncomfortably divide the natural account of our beings"; Owen Feltham, a contemporary of Browne's, began his essay on "Dreams" by writing: "Dreams are very notable means of discovering our own inclinations" and he added that the naked and natural thoughts of our minds visit us during sleep. Feltham's view has returned, with a vigorous swing, into favor. A dominant estimate of the dream supposes the "pictures and falsehoods" to be disguised versions of "our own inclinations" and the "natural thoughts of our souls" to appear in dreaming, though their nakedness may be covered by a cloak of symbolism. The modern Freudian interpretation of dreaming is not, of course, a mere repetition of Feltham: it is elaboration of a hint. Thought often seems to return upon itself, to veer backwards, when it is accepting a hint from the past. One aspect of the history of thought consists in the elaboration, during one epoch, of ideas which had been realized before but left incompletely developed as hints for future generations.

The shepherd Gyges discovered a magic ring which, when

⁷ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 1.

turned on his finger, made him invisible. His invisibility gave him opportunity to act wickedly and he made full use of it. In this myth Plato expressed the influence of the group, of society, upon the individual; the turning of the ring released Gyges from this influence and the shepherd's changed conduct revealed how great the pressure upon him of his fellows' opinion and coercion had been. This influence of the social group upon its members has always been realized, but it has never been so systematically explored as it is being explored today. The moment has come for the elaboration of the hint dropped by Plato in the story of Gyges.

Every new principle for resolving problems, whether new absolutely or freshly endowed with power, is a temptation to depend explanation too much upon it. It is true, for example, or probably true, that the dog's place in human society is determined by the social habits of his ancestors and the cat's place by the unsocial habits of hers. The dog is a member of the family; the cat is simply a lodger. Trotter is perhaps also right when he refers the dog's preliminary growl on sighting another dog to an enduring instinct, derived from the days when he hunted with the pack, to notify the herd. He probably rightly connects the dog's gluttony with the scrambles among his ancestors when the pack had brought down its quarry and the cat's dainty feeding with the private enjoyment by its ancestors of private kills. He is less convincing in convicting the cat of greater indifference to cold because she is less social than the dog. It seems to be straining the principle of group influence on its members to suppose that social animals necessarily feel cold more keenly than solitary animals because gregarious huddling favors warmth and associates coldness with separation from the herd. This comparatively trivial instance is a sample of the troubles which the modern recognition of herd influence brings, and will bring, in its train. Does Trotter rightly claim for dislike of novelty in action or thought an origin in the uniformity imposed by the herd upon its members? Human nature is constantly torn between eagerness for novelty and dislike of change. There is no surer method of irritating a man than by interrupting his habits—if it only be a new railway regulation that he must always show his "pass" at the barrier. There is no surer method of pleasing him than to show him something "new." It is tempting, very tempting, to explain this opposition between tendencies by separate originations in two sources. As society insists on its way and its single members also make their own private plans, so the individual is pressed into dislike of novelty by herd insistence on conformity and solicited by novelty through his private inclinations. This particular use of the social factor for explaining a curious feature of human life illustrates one kind of per-

plexity which is thrust upon us by modern insistence on the influence of the social group. It seems to us that a solitary, a Robinson Crusoe from birth, would dislike change and love novelty; it also seems logically simple to place delight in the new internally within the individual mind and dislike of change externally in pressure from the herd. Our previous wedding to an inveterate habit of searching through the innate constitution of the individual mind makes it difficult to appreciate the full explanatory scope of group influence. If we realize our duty to break with this inveterate habit too keenly we may break away too violently and replace one extreme by another. We must accustom ourselves to the strangeness in explanation through the group, but we must not be seduced into aiming at this strangeness and neglecting the individual constitution. There is a close connection, mental and physical, between every man and his social group and this connection explains many things. Can we, by recognizing this connection, obtain an explanation of the primitive attitude towards the dead?

Geikie refers to two neolithic burials of new-born infants with their mothers. Each mother held her child in her right arm and folded her left arm across her breast. Attention to the dead is a dividing line between man and brute, but the motives of this attention, in the early history of humanity, rouse a passing regret that men ever forsook the animal habit of disregarding death. Tenderness is suggested by the burials of infants with their mothers, but some modern practises among uncivilized peoples contain a sinister hint that tenderness was not the motive. The Eskimo, according to Captain Peary, often strangle an unweaned child when its mother dies and bury it with her. Among the Indians of Paraguayan Chaco the Rev. W. Burbrooke Grubb discovered the still more heartless practise of burying the child *alive* with its mother. The motive for these burials is *fear*—fear that the mother will return to claim her child. This fear of the dead runs through primitive death ritual. Fear of the dead, according to Scott Elliot, can not be demonstrated till the late neolithic period, but there is evidence in prehistoric interments that the fear of the dead did enter, often with grim consequences for the dying man, into human life. Wundt connects “crouched burials” with the demoniacal fierceness attributed to the dead. The Basuto treatment of the dying man is a grim commentary on these primitive crouched burials. The patient is carried before he is dead to an enclosure outside the hut and trussed, by two women who are his blood relations, with his hands and knees against his chin. Trussed or crouched burials seem to be one of the many methods of preventing the dead man from haunting the survivors. Many other burial rites have the same significance.

Deference to the dead subsequently appears in funeral rites, tender affection finally conquers the dread of demons, but, though Elliot Smith suggests that an effort after reanimation rather than an effort after effective banishment underlies the primitive treatment of the dead and dying, there seems little doubt that Wundt is right in assuming a primitive dread of the demoniacal habits and powers of the dead. Freud, agreeing with Wundt, believes that demons were originally projections of hostile feelings in survivors towards the dead. It is, at any rate, certain that fear of, and hostility to, the dead pervaded, and still pervades, the burial rites of primitive peoples and frequently dominates over all other motives.

A hint at one origin of the fear of the dead is given by conjoining Scott Elliot's remark with another by H. G. Wells. According to the former there is no evident fear of the dead till the late neolithic period; according to the latter the tribal mind appeared and sacrifice of personal impulse was forced upon man in neolithic times. Was the dead man originally hostile and therefore feared because death threw him outside the group? McDougall emphasizes the dominance of primitive societies by the group spirit: circumstances confine the savage to his group; he thinks of any individual as a member of such-and-such a group; responsibility for crime falls on the criminal's group; totems, ornaments, secret societies, ceremonies, initiations confirm and define connections with a group. Hostility to the outsider is a natural consequence of such an intense group spirit and is known to be, and to have been, rife in primitive communities. If death, in effect, by cutting off from participation in group life, converts the dead man into an outsider, it might direct upon him the fear and hostility which primitive groups naturally extend to those outside themselves.

Primitive fear of the dead had probably a complex origin, but it may be worth suggesting, for subsequent confirmation or disproof, that one of its motives was expulsion from the group by the dread event of death. The bitterest enmities separate those who once were friends: he who was, when alive, a comrade of the group, might, when dead and expelled, be intensely feared and bitterly hated.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Human Traits and their Social Significance. IRWIN EDMAN.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1920. Pp. xi+467.

This is a book designed to give to freshmen a conscious perspective of the multifarious nature of man. It sketches the activities